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Abstract 
The rapid population growth in developing countries in the middle of the 20th century 
led to fears of a population explosion and motivated the inception of what effectively became 
a global population-control program. The initiative, propelled in its beginnings by intellectual 
elites in the United States, Sweden, and some developing countries, mobilized resources to 
enact policies aimed at reducing fertility by widening contraception provision and changing 
family-size norms. In the following five decades, fertility rates fell dramatically, with a majority 
of countries converging to a fertility rate just above two children per woman, despite large 
cross-country differences in economic variables such as GDP per capita, education levels, 
urbanization, and female labour force participation. The fast decline in fertility rates in 
developing economies stands in sharp contrast with the gradual decline experienced earlier 
by more mature economies. In this paper, we argue that population-control policies are likely 
to have played a central role in the global decline in fertility rates in recent decades and can 
explain some patterns of that fertility decline that are not well accounted for by other 
socioeconomic factors.  
. 
 
Key words: fertility rates, birth rate, convergence, macro-development, Malthusian growth, 
population, population-control policies. 
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In the middle of the twentieth century, almost all developing countries experienced a 
significant increase in life expectancy, which, together with high fertility rates, led to rapid 
population growth rates. The fear of a population explosion lent impetus to what effectively 
became a global population-control program. The initiative, propelled in its beginnings by 
intellectual elites in the United States, Sweden, and some developing countries, most notably 
India, mobilized international private foundations as well as national governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations to advocate and enact policies aimed at reducing fertility. By 
1976, following the preparation of the World Population Plan of Action at the World 
Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, 40 countries, accounting for 58 percent of the 
world’s population and virtually all of the larger developing countries, had explicit policies to 
reduce fertility rates. Between 1976 and 2013, the number of countries with direct 
government support for family planning rose to 160. In this essay, we will argue that concerted 
population-control policies implemented in developing countries are likely to have played a 
central role in the global decline in fertility rates in recent decades, and can explain some 
patterns of that fertility decline that are not well accounted for by other socioeconomic 
factors.  
To set the stage, we begin by reviewing some trends and patterns in the fertility decline 
in the last half-century or so across countries and regions. We argue that although 
socioeconomic factors do play an important role in the worldwide fertility decline, they are 
far from sufficient to account for the timing and speed of the decline over the past four 
decades. For example, the cross-country data in any given year show a negative correlation 
between higher per capita income and lower fertility rates. However, that relationship has 
shifted downward considerably over time:  today the typical woman has, on average, 2 fewer 
children than the typical woman living in a country at a similar level of development in 1960.  
We then discuss the evolution of global population-control policies in more detail. All 
population-control programs involved two main elements: promoting an increase in 
information about and availability of contraceptive methods; and creating public campaigns 
aimed at establishing a new small-family norm. The evidence suggests that media campaigns 
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appeared to have been critical in complementing contraceptive provision. While establishing 
the causal effect of these programs on the fertility decline is beyond the scope of this essay, 
we use several different measures of family planning across countries to show a strong 
positive association between family planning program intensity and subsequent reductions in 
fertility, after controlling for other potential explanatory variables, such as GDP, schooling, 
urbanization, and mortality rates.  
In a final section, we discuss in more detail the role played by these other variables in 
the decline in fertility and highlight that the drop in fertility rates seems to be occurring and 
converging across countries with varying levels of urbanization, education, infant mortality, 
and so on.  We conclude that the factor that best accounts for this commonality seems to be 
population-control policies.  
 
Fertility Patterns Across Time and Space 
 
The world’s total fertility rate declined from over 5.0 children per woman in 1960 to 2.5 
children per woman in 2013.  This trend is not driven by just a few countries: Figure 1 plots 
fertility rate histograms for the start of decades since 1960; the bars show the fraction of 
countries for each fertility interval. (The figure shows 2013 rather than 2010 to report the 
latest information.) In 1960, nearly half the countries in the world had a fertility rate between 
6 and 8, and the median fertility rate was 5.8 children per woman. In 2013, the largest mass 
of countries is concentrated around 2, with the median total fertility rate equal to 2.2. (The 
total fertility rate is defined as the number of children that would be born to a woman if she 
were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current 
age-specific fertility rates. In this paper, we will use “total fertility rate” interchangeably with 
“fertility” and “fertility rate.”)  
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FIGURE 1 
Fertility histograms over time 
 
Notes: The figure shows fertility histograms at the beginning of each decade. (2013 is used rather than 2010 to 
report the latest information). The data comes from the World Bank’s WDI database. 
 
 
These large declines in fertility took place in most regions of the world, as shown in 
Figure 2.  Between 1960 and 2013 fertility rates fell from 5.4 to 1.81 in East Asia and the Pacific 
(a 66 percent reduction), from 5.98 to 2.16 in Latin America and the Caribbean,  from 6.87 to 
2.83 in the Middle East and North Africa, and from 6.02 in 1960 to 2.56 in South Asia. The 
fertility decline in Sub-Saharan Africa has been slower, but still sizable: since the 1980s, TFR 
fell from 6.7 to 5. Within this region, South Africa has already reached a TFR of 2.4 and 
Mauritius is now at a TFR of 1.44. While absolute declines in fertility were not as large in North 
America or Europe and Central Asia, the percentage declines in both regions have been 
significant— nearly 50 percent in North America and close to 40 percent in Europe and Central 
Asia. Interestingly, the fertility rate bottomed out in the 1980s, and in Europe and Central Asia, 
it bottomed out in the 1990s. 
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FIGURE 2 
Fertility trends across regions 
 
Notes: This figure plots the trends in fertility by region, as defined by the World Bank, between 1960 and 2013. 
The data comes from the WDI database. 
A vast literature in macro-development has tried to explain the determinants of fertility 
rates. Most studies build on the seminal framework of Becker (1960), Becker and Barro (1988), 
and Barro and Becker (1989), who illustrate how economic variables can influence fertility 
choice, especially though a tradeoff between a lower quantity of children and a higher 
investment in each child. In two recent examples in this literature, Jones, Schoonbroodt, and 
Tertilt (2011) study the theoretical conditions under which economic models can yield a 
negative relation between income and fertility, while Manuelli and Sheshadri (2009) seek to 
explain differences in fertility rates across countries based on productivity and tax differences.  
 A number of empirical studies have documented a negative relationship between 
fertility rates and income. While this relationship is indeed negative in the cross-section of 
countries, the relationship has changed over time, shifting downward and becoming flatter 
over time. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the total fertility rate and real GDP per 
capita both in 1960 and in 2013. The figure also shows a fitted line for these two years.1 The 
                                                            
1 Specifically, the fitted line is given by the lowess function (locally weighted smoothing function) between TFR 
and the log of GDP per capita. 
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downward shift has been, on average, around 2 children per woman, meaning that today a 
woman has 2 fewer children than a woman living in a country at the same level of 
development in 1960. Given that this shift is close in magnitude to the drop in overall world 
fertility of 2.5 children per woman, it seems that rising per capita income is unable to explain 
a large part of the decline in fertility over the past few decades. The relationship between 
fertility and income observed in 1960 would predict a TFR of around 4 at the average per 
capita GDP for 2013. 
FIGURE 3 
Fertility-Income relation in 1960 and 2013 
 
Notes: The figure shows the scatterplots and lowess smoothed relationship between fertility and log of per capita 
GDP (in constant 2005 US$) in 1960 and 2013. The data is from the WDI database and the sample consists of 88 
countries. 
As Figure 3 illustrates, the issue is not just to explain a decline in global fertility.  It is also 
necessary to explain why the fall in fertility rates witnessed by developing countries in recent 
decades was so very rapid, compared with the rather slow and secular decline in fertility rates 
experienced by more mature economies. For example, the fertility decline began as early as 
the mid-1700s in some European countries and only reached replacement levels in the early 
twentieth century (Ansley 1969).  Further, it is necessary to explain why countries with 
markedly different levels of income, urbanization, education, and other factors are all 
converging to very similar fertility rates. As we discuss in the next section, the worldwide 
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spread of population-control programs can help to explain these patterns in the fertility data. 
The Global Family Planning Movement and its Consequences 
Global Evolution of Global Family Planning Programs  
After World War II, there was growing preoccupation with the unprecedented levels of 
population growth.2 A population-control movement developed, led by, among others, John 
D. Rockefeller III, whose main preoccupations were the growing imbalance between 
population and resource growth and the potential for political instability given that most of 
the population growth was concentrated in the poorest countries of the world. In 1952, 
Rockefeller founded the Population Council, aimed at providing research and technical 
assistance for population programs across the world. That same year, India started the first 
national population program and, in parallel, the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation was established.3 By the late 1950s, the “population question” was receiving the 
attention of the US government. A report by the Presidential Committee studying the United 
States Military Assistance Program released in 1959 devoted an entire chapter to the issue, 
ending with a recommendation that the government “assist those countries with which it is 
cooperating in economic aid programs, on request, in the formulation of their plans designed 
to deal with the problem of rapid population growth” (Draper 1959).4 By this time private 
foundations including the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations were already providing seed 
funding for research and planning programs, but it was in the mid-1960s when large-scale 
funding became available and the population planning movement really took off.  
The first large-scale intervention was carried out by the Swedish government, which 
supported family planning efforts in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), India, and Pakistan, starting in 
1962 (Sinding 2007). Over time, several international organizations, like USAID and the World 
                                                            
2 This section draws heavily on Robinson and Ross (2007), who provide a compilation of case studies of family 
planning programs in 22 countries across the world. 
3 The earlier birth-control movement led by Margaret Sanger in the United States (who set up the first birth-
control clinic in the USA in 1916) and Elise Ottesen-Jensen in Sweden was another force leading to the efforts for 
fertility reduction.  
4 For more references that trace the origins of the population-control movement primarily to the West see 
Appendix C. 
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Bank, joined in providing funds and support for family planning programs around the world. 
The invention of the modern intrauterine device (IUD) and the oral contraceptive pill around 
the same time allowed for the possibility of easy-to-use and effective contraceptive methods 
becoming widely available for public use. 
 
These early family planning efforts showed rapid effects in East Asian countries, 
including Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Thailand. Program implementation and 
success would take longer in other developing countries, partly due to the difficulty of 
overcoming cultural inhibitions and religious opposition towards birth control, as well as 
operational problems including inadequate transport infrastructure and insufficient funding. 
The World Population Conference in 1974 appeared to be a turning point for the global family 
planning movement. Tables 1 and 2 show how countries around the world have been 
categorized by their fertility goals and the type of government support for family planning for 
selected years from 1976-2013, according to the UN World Population Policy database.  
 
TABLE 1 
Number of countries with government goals for fertility policy  
Year 
Lower 
fertility 
Maintain 
fertility 
No 
intervention 
Raise 
fertility 
Nr. of 
Observations 
1976 40 19 78 13 150 
1986 54 16 75 19 164 
1996 82 19 65 27 193 
2005 78 31 47 38 194 
2013 84 33 26 54 197 
Notes: The table shows the number of countries by type of policy adopted towards fertility. The data is obtained 
from the U.N. World Population Policies database and begins in 1976. Countries are categorized according to 
whether they had a policy to lower, maintain or raise fertility or if they had no intervention to change fertility. 
 
In 1976, for example, the 40 countries that had explicit policies to limit fertility, covered 
nearly one-third of East Asian countries, a quarter of Latin American and Caribbean countries 
and nearly two-thirds of South Asian countries. By contrast, only one-fifth of countries in 
North Africa, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa had a fertility reduction policy in 1976. 
By 1996, 82 countries had a fertility reduction policy in place (by this time, some of them had 
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reached their fertility reduction targets and changed to policies of maintaining fertility rates) 
including half of the countries in East Asia and Latin America, and more than two-thirds of the 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. These countries represent 70 percent of the 
world’s population. In 1976, 95 governments were providing direct support for family 
planning. (Support for family planning was not always associated to an explicitly stated goal 
of reducing fertility.) The number of countries with state support for family planning has 
continued to rise steadily.  
 
TABLE 2 
Number of countries by government support for family planning 
Year 
Direct 
support 
Indirect 
support 
No support 
Limit/Not 
permitted 
     Nr. of 
Observations 
1976 95 17 28 10 150 
1986 117 22 18 7 164 
1996 143 18 26 2 193 
2005 143 35 15 1 194 
2013 160 20 16 1 197 
Notes: The table shows the number of countries by the type of support extended by the state for family planning 
services. The data is obtained from the UN World Population Policies database and begins from 1976. Countries 
are categorized by whether their governments directly supported, indirectly supported or did not support family 
planning as well as if the government limited family planning services or did not permit family planning in the 
country. 
 
Features of Family Planning Programs 
The early phases of family planning programs in most developing countries typically 
sought to provide a range of contraception methods – some combination of oral 
contraceptives, IUD, condoms, sterilization, and abortion – and information on their use. 
However, increases in the supply of contraceptives proved insufficient to lower fertility rates 
to desired levels, particularly in poorer or more traditional societies. This failure led to 
concerted efforts to change public attitudes and beliefs and establish a new small-family norm 
through active mass-media campaigns. We discuss these two phases in turn. 
 
The implementation of the family planning programs varied vastly across countries. 
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Differences included the role of public and private provision; the price at which contraception 
was offered, subsidies to production or sales, the delivery system through which services were 
provided, the outlets for the mass-media campaigns, and the various supplementary policies 
that accompanied the core measures (Freedman and Berelson 1976).5 
 
Most countries began their family planning programs with a clinic-based approach that 
took advantage of the existing health infrastructure to provide modern contraceptive 
methods. Many countries also implemented programs in hospitals to advise women on the 
use of contraception, often after giving birth or undergoing an abortion. However, this 
approach had limited success in countries where a large proportion of women gave birth 
outside of the formal health care system, like India and Iran. Thus, it was supplemented by 
the deployment of trained field workers who made house calls, particularly in rural areas. In 
some nations, such as Iran and Malaysia, family-planning programs were linked to maternal 
and child health services at an early stage, which allowed for better integration of the program 
into the country’s health system. Towards the 1990s, with the rebranding of family planning 
as sexual and reproductive wellbeing, more countries have followed this approach. 
Many of the family planning programs established in the 1950s and 1960s, which 
focused on increasing the supply of contraception, failed to gain much traction. For instance, 
highly traditional societies and countries with a predominantly Catholic or Muslim population 
had difficulty gaining wide acceptance for their family planning programs. It became clear that 
without changing the willingness to use contraceptives and, more importantly, reducing the 
desired number of children, merely improving access to birth control had limited impact. The 
importance of changing the desired number of children, in particular, was highlighted by 
leading demographers at the time such as Enke (1960) and Davis (1967), who argued that a 
desire to use contraceptives was perfectly compatible with high fertility. Countries thus began 
to present and to adapt their population-control policies to address these concerns.  
                                                            
5 For a more detailed summary of the key features of early family planning programs around the world, 
highlighting the countries that implemented each approach, see the Appendix Table available with this paper at 
http://e-jep.org. 
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For example, early in Indonesia’s family planning program, the government published a 
pamphlet titled “Views of Religions on Family Planning,” which documented the general 
acceptance of family planning by four of Indonesia’s five official religions— Islam, Hinduism, 
and Protestant and Catholic Christianity (Hull 2007). To overcome fears that husbands would 
resist male doctors or health professionals working with their wives, the family planning 
program in Bangladesh relied heavily on female health workers visiting women in their homes 
to educate them about and supply them with contraceptive methods. This modality also 
ensured a greater diffusion of contraceptive knowledge and methods in rural Bangladesh 
(Schuler, Hashemi, and Jenkins 1995). 
 
Mass communication was commonly used to shape attitudes toward family planning, 
often with the aim of changing public views by establishing a small-family norm. During the 
1970s, slogans proliferated in different media outlets (TV, radio, and magazines), street 
posters, brochures, and billboards, all conveying a similar message regarding the benefits of 
small families. In India, the family planning program’s slogan, “Have only two or three children, 
that’s enough,” was widely publicized on billboards and the sides of buildings. Other slogans 
in India were “A small family is a happy family” and “Big family: problems all the way; small 
family: happiness all the way” (Khanna 2009). Bangladesh publicized the slogans “Boy or girl, 
two children are enough” and “One child is ideal, two children are enough” (Begum 1983). 
South Korea ran the slogan “Stop at two, regardless of sex” (Kim and Ross 2007); Hong Kong 
chose “Two is enough” (Fan 2007), and so on. China took population planning to the extreme 
in 1979, when it imposed a coercive one-child policy, but the Chinese fertility rate actually 
started falling significantly in the early 1970s, before the one-child policy was implemented 
(Zhang 2017). The strong population-control policy enacted in 1973 was characterized by 
mass-media messages such as “Later, longer, fewer” (Tien 1980) and “One is not too few, two, 
just right, and three, too many” (Liang and Lee 2006). In Singapore, bumper stickers, coasters, 
calendars and key chains reinforcing the family planning message were distributed free of 
charge. In Bangladesh, television aired a drama highlighting the value of family planning 
(Piotrow and Kincaid 2000). The Indonesian program became particularly noteworthy in its 
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collaboration between the government and community groups in getting the messages of the 
program across.  
In Latin America, the Population Media Centre (a non-profit organization) collaborates 
with a social marketing organization in Brazil to ensure the inclusion of social and health 
themes in soap operas airing on TV Globo, the most popular television network in Brazil. (TV 
Globo’s programming is estimated to currently reach 98 percent of Brazil’s population, and 65 
percent of all of Spanish-speaking Latin America.) The Population Media Centre studied how 
programs like “Paginas da Vida” (“Pages of Life”) influenced Brazilians: about two-thirds of 
women interviewed said “Paginas da Vida” had helped them take steps to prevent unwanted 
pregnancy. Brazil’s telenovelas have been popular across Latin America since the 1980s; they 
almost invariably depict the lives of characters from small families, who were also very rich 
and glamorous (Population Media Centre 2016).  In Brazil, the main force behind the anti-
natalist movement was BEMFAM, an affiliate of the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation. The military regime of the 1970s and the Catholic Church hierarchy were opposed 
to birth control, though the local clergy and multiple nongovernmental organizations advised 
and informed in favor of contraceptive use. In other Latin American countries, such as 
Colombia and Chile, family planning had strong support from the government. 
  
Stronger inducements such as monetary or in-kind incentives and disincentives were 
also used in some countries as means of encouraging families to practice birth control. In 
Tunisia, for example, government family allowances were limited to the first four children; in 
Singapore, income tax relief was restricted to the first three children as was maternity leave, 
the allocation of public apartments, and preferred school places. Incentives for female or male 
sterilization was a common feature of family planning programs in India, Bangladesh, and Sri 
Lanka and resulted in a large number of sterilizations taking place during the 1970s. In 
Bangladesh, field health workers were paid for accompanying an individual to a sterilization 
procedure, while in Sri Lanka and India both the sterilization provider and patient were given 
compensation. In Kerala, India, individuals undergoing sterilization were given payments in 
cash and food, roughly equivalent to a month’s income for a typical person. This type of 
incentivized compensation scheme, combined with increased regional sterilization targets, led 
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to a drastic increase in sterilization procedures. Critics alleged that many acceptors were 
coerced by officials who stood to gain from higher numbers, both in monetary and political 
terms. 
 
In addition to increased provision of information on and access to family planning 
methods, attempts were made to delay marriage and childbearing or to increase birth spacing 
as a means of controlling fertility. For example, the legal age of marriage was increased to 18 
years for women and 21 years for men in India, and to 17 years for women and 20 years for 
men in Tunisia. China raised the legal age for marriage in urban areas (to 25 years for women 
and 28 years for men) and rural areas (23 years for women and 25 years for men). China also 
imposed a minimum gap of three to four years between births and restricted the number of 
children to three per couple until it decided to implement the draconian one-child policy in 
1979. 
More recently, given the sizeable decline in birth rates that has already occurred, fertility 
control has been put on the back burner. In fact, the current HIV/AIDS epidemic has somewhat 
overshadowed fertility control, particularly in African countries (Robinson and Ross 2007), 
while family planning did not even warrant being a sub-goal in the Millennium Development 
Goals agreed to in 2000. Many countries are also now below replacement-level fertility rates. 
Nonetheless, family planning programs seem to have been incorporated into the broader 
framework of sexual and reproductive health services and become firmly entrenched in health 
care systems around the world.  
The details of fertility programs differed across countries. But from a broader view, the 
prevalence and growth of these programs is remarkable. Fertility reduction programs took 
place under both democratic and autocratic regimes, whether oriented to the political left or 
right (for example, Chile under both Allende and Pinochet), and in Buddhist, Christian, and 
Muslim countries alike. In some countries, like Brazil, family planning programs were initiated 
and almost exclusively run by non-profit, nongovernmental organizations, while in others, like 
Singapore or India, the government was fully involved. 
A natural question is whether the type of less coercive intervention carried out by most 
countries can be effective in helping to rapidly change norms and in overcoming other 
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socioeconomic influences that affect fertility rates. In the context of China, Zhang (2017) 
observes that the one-child policy can explain only a small change in fertility given that a 
robust family planning program was already in operation since the early 1970s. He argues that 
strong family planning programs, such as those observed in most East Asian countries during 
the 1960s and early 1970s, would be as effective in lowering fertility. In addition, recent 
experimental (or quasi-experimental) studies also suggest the effectiveness of public 
persuasion measures in reducing fertility. La Ferrara, Chong, and Duryea (2012) find that 
Brazilian regions covered by a television network showing soap operas that portray small 
families experienced a bigger reduction in fertility rates. In Uganda, Bandiera, Buehren, 
Burgess, Goldstein, Gulesci, Rasul, and Sulaiman (2014) find that, adolescent girls who 
received information on sex, reproduction, and marriage reported wanting a smaller number 
of children. Evidence of family planning programs in the United States appears more mixed, 
though recently, Bailey (2013) has shown that a targeted U.S. family planning program 
significantly reduced fertility. In the next section we explore the question using cross-country 
data on spending and implementation effort of the program and their relationship with 
fertility reduction. 
Fertility Policies and the Decline in Fertility Rates 
In seeking to assess the quantitative effect of the fertility programs on the basis of cross-
country data, there are clearly a number of covariates that could confound the estimation of 
a causal effect. The task is particularly difficult since different countries opted for a wide and 
varied range of fertility policies, with the specific choice of measures partly dictated by their 
feasibility in each country’s institutional and cultural setting. Equally important, data 
availability is also limited. Thus, while estimating the causal effect of these programs is beyond 
the scope of this essay, our analysis illustrates descriptive relationships between fertility rates, 
population policy, and different measures of family planning program intensity, conditioning 
on covariates of fertility traditionally used in the literature. Taken as a whole, this evidence is 
strongly consistent with the hypothesis that population control programs have played a major 
role in the fertility decline.  
As a first exercise, we compare the country-level patterns in mean fertility rate by the 
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fertility policy goals stated in 1976, which paints the striking picture shown in Figure 4. The 
data on fertility policy begins in 1976, but several countries had already adopted fertility 
reduction policies beforehand. While fertility has fallen in all regions, even in the group of 
predominantly European countries that wanted to increase fertility, the countries that had 
identified the need to reduce fertility in 1976 recorded by far the highest average fertility rates 
before 1976, but the second-lowest average fertility rates by 2013. The countries where there 
was no intervention had the second-highest average fertility rates in 1976 and became the 
highest fertility group by 2013.  
FIGURE 4 
Evolution of fertility rates by policy in 1976 
 
Notes: The figure illustrates the evolution of weighted average total fertility rate, with countries grouped by the 
fertility policy observed in 1976. The policy could be to lower, maintain, or raise fertility; there also could be no 
intervention. 
 
For the analysis that follows, infant mortality rates, the proportion of urban population, 
and per capita GDP are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, while 
data on the years of schooling of the population aged 25+ are taken from Barro and Lee (2013). 
Data on the existence of a fertility policy and government support for family planning 
come from the UN World Population Policies Database. We use three measures of family 
planning program intensity: funds for family planning per capita; a family planning program 
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effort score; and the percentage of women exposed to family planning messages through 
mass media. Data on funds for family planning are taken from Nortman and Hofstatter (1978); 
Nortman (1982); and Ross, Mauldin and Miller (1993) which, taken together, cover funding 
for family planning by source for 58 countries over various years starting in 1972 and going up 
to 1992. Family planning program effort is measured using the Family Planning Program Effort 
Index published in Ross and Stover (2001). This indicator, based on work by Lapham and 
Mauldin (1984), measures the strength of a given country’s program along four dimensions: 
policies, services, evaluation, and method access. The score has a potential range of 0–300 
points, based on 1–10 points for each of 30 items, and has been calculated for 1972, 1982, 
1989, 1994, and 1999 covering 95 countries. Finally, the Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS) from 57 countries in various years provide data on the percentage of women who have 
been exposed to family planning messages on the radio, television or newspapers. These three 
measures altogether aim at capturing the intensity with which population programs were 
implemented.  
As our next exercise to study the relation between population programs and fertility, we 
use data on funds for family planning. We look at the amount of funds (in real terms) available 
for family planning, from both government and nongovernment sources over the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s for each country.  
The patterns by region are as follows. Latin American countries appear to have the 
largest amount of funds per capita, with total funding exceeding US$2 per capita (in 2005 US 
dollars) in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Puerto Rico. The region also has the highest proportion 
of non-state funding for family planning, more than double the state-funding in some 
countries. By contrast, in Asia, funding for family planning is predominantly state-led. As a 
percentage of GDP, total funds for family planning averaged at around 0.05 percent in the 
1970s and 0.07 percent in the 1980s, but was as high as 0.47 percent in Bangladesh and 0.46 
in Korea in the 1980s.6  
                                                            
6 The full table with funds for family planning by country for the 1970s and 1980s is available in the online 
Appendix. 
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Table 3 shows the results of a regression of the change in fertility on (logged) average 
family planning funds per capita over the 1970s, 80s and 90s, with and without controlling for 
changes in the covariates of fertility traditionally used in the literature, such as GDP per capita, 
educational attainment, urbanization and infant mortality. (Each of these covariates will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section). Columns (1) and (2) use absolute changes 
in all fertility (and the other covariates) between 1960 and 2013 and columns (3) and (4) use 
percentage changes in these variables over the same period.  
Despite the small number of observations available once the controls are included, the 
negative relationship between changes in TFR and funds for family planning remains 
significant, indicating that the countries with more funding for family planning experienced 
greater reductions in fertility rates, even after controlling for the changes in income, 
urbanization, infant mortality and years of schooling of the adult population. (Controlling for 
years of schooling of adult women instead of adult population leads to similar results.) 
Quantitatively, the results indicate that a 1 percent increase in funding per capita is associated 
with a 5 percent reduction in the total fertility rate.  
We do not include changes in female labor force participation rates in this regression 
because the cross-country data for this variable begins only in 1980. However, we replicate 
the exercise focusing on changes between 1980 and 2013 for all variables and find that the 
results hardly change, with no significant correlation between changes in female labor force 
participation and the fertility decline. We also carry out the exercise separately for 
government funding and private funding for family planning per capita, and find that 
government spending has a significant, positive correlation with the fertility decline whereas 
private spending does not appear to be significant (see the Online Appendix for the full set of 
results).  
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TABLE 3 
Change in fertility rates and funding for family planning programs 
Change in TFR Absolute change % change 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(average funds per 
capita) 
-0.630*** -0.430** -10.47*** -4.974** 
[0.120] [0.181] [1.487] [2.030] 
Change in years of 
education of adults 
 -0.13  0.001 
 [0.133]  [0.002] 
Change in urban 
population as % of total 
 -0.008  0.001 
 [0.009]  [0.003] 
Change in ln(GDP per 
capita) 
 -0.426*  -0.382** 
 [0.227]  [0.158] 
Change in infant 
mortality rate 
 0.006*  0.668*** 
 [0.003]  [0.131] 
     
N 56 37 56 37 
R-squared 0.35 0.39 0.418 0.72 
 Notes: The table reports the results of regressions of the change in TFR between 2013 and 1960 on the logged 
real value of average per capita funds for family planning for the 1970s, 80s and 90s, controlling for the changes 
in years of schooling of the population aged 25+, urban population as a percentage of total population, log GDP 
per capita and infant mortality rate between 2013 and 1960. Given the small number of observations for IMR 
and GDP per capita in 1960, we use the earliest available observation before 1965 to construct the change. All 
regressions include a constant. Per capita funds for family planning are converted to 2005 US$ before averaging. 
Data on total fertility rate, urban population, per capita GDP, infant mortality rate and US Consumer Price Index 
(used to convert the funds to real terms) are from the World Development Indicators. Data on years of schooling 
is from Barro-Lee (2013). Data on funds for family planning are from Nortman and Hofstatter (1978), Nortman 
(1982) and Ross, Mauldin and Miller (1993). The values in parentheses are robust standard errors. * Significant 
at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level ***Significant at 1% level. 
          
Our third exercise uses the family planning program effort index published by Ross and 
Stover (2001) as an alternative measure of program inputs. The regional averages of the index 
indicate that East Asia and South Asia have, in general, had the strongest family planning 
programs over time. Latin America, North Africa, and the Middle East seem to have caught up 
on program effort over the three decades, but the greatest gain appears to have been in Sub-
Saharan Africa, which was the latest to adopt family planning programs, in 1989-1999.7 We 
use these data to examine the relationship between the observed change in fertility over the 
                                                            
7 For more details on regional average program effort scores by year, see the Appendix Table available with 
this paper at http://e-jep.org. 
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1960–2013 period and the average program effort score over the 1970s, 80s and 90s, again 
controlling for the other covariates of fertility. Table 4 indicates a strong negative relationship, 
with larger fertility declines in countries with higher program effort.  
Table 4 
Change in fertility rates and family planning program effort 
Change in TFR Absolute change % change 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average family planning 
program effort score 
-0.039*** -0.041*** -0.716*** -0.500*** 
[0.007] [0.014] [0.101] [0.166] 
Change in years of education 
of adults 
 -0.124  0.003 
 [0.115]  [0.003] 
Change in urban population 
as % of total 
 -0.012  -0.0001 
 [0.008]  [0.005] 
Change in ln(GDP per capita)  0.015  -0.108 
 [0.198]  [0.192] 
Change in infant mortality 
rate 
 0.002  0.549*** 
 [0.003]  [0.142] 
     
N 107 55 107 55 
R-squared 0.21 0.41 0.321 0.636 
 Notes: The table reports the results of regressions of the change in TFR between 2013 and 1960 on the average 
family planning program effort score over the 1970s, 80s and 90s, controlling for the change in years of schooling 
of the population aged 25+, urban population as a percentage of total population, log GDP per capita and infant 
mortality rate between 2013 and 1960. All regressions include a constant. Given the small number of 
observations for IMR and GDP per capita in 1960, we use the earliest available observation before 1965 to 
construct the change. All regressions include a constant. Data on total fertility rate, urban population, per capita 
GDP, and infant mortality rate are from the World Development Indicators. Data on years of schooling is from 
Barro-Lee (2013). Data on family planning program effort is from Ross and Stover (2001). The values in 
parentheses are robust standard errors.  
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level ***Significant at 1% level 
Next, we use the DHS data on percentage of women exposed to family planning 
messages through mass media to carry out the same exercise as for family planning program 
funds and program effort score. Table 5 shows these results. The context of this analysis is 
slightly different from the two previous exercises because the data are based on DHS surveys 
which were carried out predominantly in Sub-Saharan African countries (30 of the countries 
in the sample used in Columns (1) and (3) and 15 of the countries in the sample used in 
Columns (2) and (4)) starting from the early 1990s. Therefore, these results capture more 
recent efforts in family planning as seen in Sub-Saharan Africa. The regression results show a 
significant, negative association between the fertility change and exposure to family planning 
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messages after controlling for other covariates. It, therefore, seems likely that the delay in 
the implementation of the family planning programs in Sub-Saharan Africa explains the 
delayed decline in fertility in the region. Both in Table 4 and Table 5, the coefficients 
corresponding to the policy measure change little when adding the controls; this suggests 
that additional omitted variables are unlikely to make a difference.  
Table 5 
Change in fertility rates and exposure to family planning messages 
Change in TFR Absolute change % change 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
% of women with exposure to 
FP messages on mass media 
-0.038*** -0.050*** -0.602*** -0.449** 
[0.007] [0.011] [0.090] [0.169] 
Change in years of education 
of adults 
 0.054  0.001 
 [0.154]  [0.002] 
Change in urban population 
as % of total 
 -0.035**  -0.016 
 [0.016]  [0.010] 
Change in ln(GDP per capita) -0.529**  -0.379* 
 [0.244]  [0.197] 
Change in infant mortality 
rate 
 0.002  0.551*** 
 [0.005]  [0.175] 
     
N 57 30 57 30 
R-squared 0.301 0.567 0.347 0.631 
Notes: The table reports the results of regressions of the change in TFR between 2013 and 1960 on the 
percentage of women exposed to family planning messages through mass media for earliest year (before 2005) 
for which information is available for that country, controlling for the change between 2013 and 1960 in years 
of schooling of the population aged 25+, urban population as a percentage of total population, log GDP per capita 
and infant mortality rate. All regressions include a constant. Given the small number of observations for IMR and 
GDP per capita in 1960, we use the earliest available observation before 1965 to construct the change. Data on 
total fertility rate, urban population, per capita GDP, and infant mortality rate are from the World Development 
Indicators. Data on years of schooling is from Barro-Lee (2013). Data on exposure to family planning messages is 
from DHS surveys from various years. The values in parentheses are robust standard errors.  
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level ***Significant at 1% level 
As an additional robustness check, in the Appendix we exploit variation in the starting 
year of state-led family planning programs in 31 countries to further explore the relationship 
between fertility decline and the establishment of these programs. After controlling for 
changes in covariates as well as shocks that might have affected fertility in all countries in a 
given year, we find that the decline in fertility accelerated with their inception. Given the very 
small sample size, which comprises mainly the early adopters of family planning, we do not 
place too much weight on these results but consider it to be further suggestive evidence in 
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favor of the importance of these programs in accelerating the fertility decline.8 
These exercises demonstrate a strong association between the establishment and 
intensity of family planning programs with the decline in fertility rates, after adjusting for 
changes in per capita income, urbanization, infant mortality, female labour force participation 
and educational attainment. Most Sub-Saharan African governments acknowledged rapid 
population growth as a policy concern much later than developing countries elsewhere. Even 
after the formulation of population control policies, commitment to family planning lagged 
behind that of other regions leading most international agencies working in family planning to 
invest their resources in the more promising areas of Asia and Latin America. The onset of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic is also likely to have weakened the emphasis on fertility control due to 
limited resources being targeted towards addressing the epidemic as well as the emergence 
of a pro-natalist response to the high mortality rates caused by the epidemic (National 
Research Council Working Group on Factors Affecting Contraceptive Use 1993). While almost 
all African countries now provide direct or indirect support for family planning their efforts 
have only recently caught up with the rest of the world. Perhaps not surprisingly in light of the 
strong correlations, the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are the ones where fertility rates still 
remain above the world’s average. 
Considering Other Explanations for the Decline in Fertility 
A number of other socioeconomic factors have been suggested as possible causes for 
the decline in fertility: urbanization, greater investment in education per child, rising female 
labor force participation, and lower infant mortality. The regressions presented in the 
previous section indicate that, population-control policies are strongly associated with the 
fertility decline, whereas some of the traditional covariates display a much weaker 
association. Of course, these results are hardly conclusive, as disentangling cause and effect 
in this area quite difficult; an issue which is compounded by the shortage of data and potential 
measurement error. In this section, we provide further arguments for why these factors, while 
important, are unlikely to overshadow the role of population-control policies in the fertility 
                                                            
8 The results of this analysis are available in the Online Appendix available at http://e-jep.org. 
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decline. 
Urbanization has been put forward as an explanation for the decline in fertility, as rural 
areas have historically had much higher fertility rates than urban ones. Arguably, in rural 
areas, children can be a significant input in agricultural production. Moreover, despite the fact 
that parents can earn higher average wages in urban areas, it can cost more to raise children 
there, as the costs of housing and (typically compulsory) education are higher.9 The negative 
relationship between urbanization and fertility is illustrated in Figure 5, which plots the 
proportion of population living in urban areas against the total fertility rate for all countries in 
1960 and in 2013. Although countries with less urbanization have higher fertility, it does not 
appear that the urbanization process alone can account for the sharp decline in fertility rates 
observed over the past five decades. Rather, it appears that fertility rates fell rapidly in both 
urban and rural areas.  
FIGURE 5 
Fertility and Urbanization 
 
Notes: The figure shows the scatter plot and smoothed lowess relationship between fertility and urbanization in 
1960 and 2013. Urbanization is measured as the proportion of the population living in urban areas. Data comes 
from the WDI database and covers 184 countries. 
Given the strong possibility that the cross-country data on urbanization is mis-measured, 
                                                            
9 This idea is presented in Becker (1960) as farmers having a comparative advantage in producing both children 
and food, though this advantage is smaller for higher “quality” of childrearing. Caldwell (1976)’s net wealth flow 
theory also supports the view that wealth flows from children to parents in primitive agricultural societies, 
whereas the direction of flows reverses as society modernizes and costs of raising children go up. 
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we explored this issue in more detail using the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data 
from 63 countries which, through their identification of rural and urban areas, provide 
separate rural and urban fertility rates. The decline in fertility can be decomposed into a 
within-area effect, corresponding to the decline in fertility within either rural or urban areas, 
and a between-area effect (that is, the urbanization effect), corresponding to the decline in 
fertility rates due to the increase in the share of the population living in (lower-fertility) urban 
areas rather than (higher-fertility) rural areas.10 Perhaps surprisingly, the increased 
urbanization (between-area effect) contributed to only about 15 percent of the fertility 
decline. Most of the decline in fertility is explained by the within-area effect. Moreover, the 
contribution of urbanization to the decline in fertility does not vary significantly with a 
country’s fertility or urbanization rates. This result suggests that while urbanization may be a 
small part of the decline in fertility rates, other forces have been at work driving down fertility 
in both rural and urban areas around the world. 
The decline in fertility is often discussed as being part of a shift away from the quantity 
of children towards higher quality, as demonstrated by the increase in education levels around 
the world. There is clearly a strong negative relationship between fertility and education, but 
it is difficult to establish the direction of causality between fertility and education given that 
they are both endogenous outcomes of a household’s decision making process. For example, 
quantity-quality trade-offs are analyzed in Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and Moav (2002), 
where technological growth, by raising the return to human capital, can generate a 
demographic transition. (See also Doepke, 2004.) The link between fertility and education 
emerges not just because of a tradeoff between quantity and quality (or education) of the 
children, but also because educated parents choose to have fewer children, possibly because 
they attach more value to quality in that tradeoff or they have a comparative advantage in 
educating children (Moav, 2005). Remarkably, fertility has fallen significantly even in countries 
and rural areas where educational attainment still remains low. For instance, Bangladesh, 
Morocco, Myanmar, and Nepal all recorded fertility rates below 2.7, with percentage declines 
of over 60 percent from their 1960 levels, despite their populations having less than 5 years 
                                                            
10 It should be noted that because these surveys were carried out in different years and at different intervals 
in different countries, the period over which the changes are computed is not the same for every country. Details 
of the data and calculations are available in the online Appendix available with this paper at http://e-jep.org. 
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of schooling on average in 2010. Table 6 presents the average fertility rate in 2010 and fertility 
change (between 2013 and 1960) for countries grouped by the level of education of the adult 
population in 2010. While fertility rates are clearly declining in the years of schooling of the 
population, all but the lowest education group display sizeable percentage declines in fertility. 
The countries with less than 3 years of schooling in 2010 are nearly all in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where TFR is still very high. 
Table 6 
Fertility change by education in 2010 
Schooling in 2010 
Absolute 
change in TFR 
% change in 
TFR 
TFR in 2010 
Years<=3 -1.35 -19.12 5.87 
3<years<=6 -3.23 -52.26 3.15 
6<years<=9 -4.09 -67.23 2.04 
9<years<=12 -1.67 -43.50 1.73 
years>12 -1.51 -45.22 1.81 
Notes: The table present the average absolute and percentage change in TFR between 2013 and 1960 as well as 
average TFR in 2010 by years of schooling groups. Years of schooling is grouped into 5 categories: years<=3, 
3<years<=6, 6<years<=9, 9<years<=12 and years>12. Years of schooling is for the population aged 25+ in 2010 
and covers 143 countries. Data on fertility is from the WDI database and years of schooling is from Barro and Lee 
(2013). 
The cross-country correlation between female labor force participation and fertility 
indicates only a weak relationship, given the high female labor force participation in European 
and North American countries as well as in Sub-Saharan African countries. (Data on female 
labour force participation rates are obtained from ILOSTAT.) Furthermore, labor force 
participation rates did not change much over the past few decades, other than in Latin 
America and the Caribbean where the female labor force participation rate (LFPR) rose from 
34 percent in 1980 to 54 percent in 2013. (Over the same period, female LFPR fell slightly in 
East Asia and the Pacific (from 64 to 61 percent) and South Asia (from 35 to 30 percent), while 
it rose slightly in the Middle East and North Africa (from 18 to 22 percent), and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (from 57 to 64 percent).) 
Changes in infant mortality rates appear to be highly correlated with changes in fertility. 
There are two, not mutually exclusive, interpretations of this correlation. First, as infant 
mortality declines, fewer births are needed to ensure that a family’s desired number of 
children survives to adulthood (see, for example, Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002). The second 
interpretation, which we have emphasized in this paper, is that the decline in mortality rates 
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and the consequent population acceleration in the 1950s and 1960s, triggered the 
population-control movement; this, in turn, with its emphasis on changing family-size norms 
and contraception provision, accelerated the fertility fall by reducing the desired number of 
children and the number of unwanted births. 
Regarding the first interpretation, it is apparent that fertility rates did not react to the 
decline in mortality rates quickly enough, and it is precisely the slow reaction of TFR that 
caused the remarkable acceleration in population growth in the 1950s and 1960s. As noted 
in the Report of the President’s Committee to Study the US Military Assistance Program 
(1959), “high fertility rates are normally part of deeply rooted cultural patterns and natural 
changes occur only slowly.” This was also the view shared by demographers (see Enke, 1960, 
and Davis, 1967).  Our regression analysis in the previous section has attempted to gauge the 
two channels separately and indeed both appeared relevant. Another way to tease out the 
role played by population-control programs as separate from the direct effect of infant 
mortality, is to study the behavior of the desired or ideal number of children and the share of 
unwanted pregnancies, two main targets of the population-control programs. In principle, 
according to the first interpretation (Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002), lower mortality rates should only 
affect the number of births, not the ideal number of surviving children.11 Instead, population-
control programs focused on influencing the desired number of children or family size.  
The DHS provides two measures aimed at capturing fertility preferences: one is the 
“ideal number of children” and the other is “wanted fertility rate”. The ideal number of 
children is obtained as a response to the question “If you could go back to the time you did 
not have any children and could choose exactly the number of children to have in your whole 
life, how many would that be?” The wanted fertility rate is constructed as the fertility rate 
that would be observed if all “unwanted” births were eliminated; i.e. deleting births that raise 
the number of surviving children over the stated desired number of children (Rutstein and 
Rojas 2006). We consider the ideal or desired number of children as a measure of preference 
for surviving children: the number of children the woman would choose to have in her whole 
                                                            
11 Interestingly, the Barro-Becker framework predicts that, as mortality rates fall, the number of surviving 
children actually increases, as the cost of raising children decreases. See Doepke (2005), who analyses 
different variants of the Barro-Becker model yielding this prediction. 
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life. The second, wanted fertility, is directly affected by the desired number of children, but 
can deviate from it for reasons that are unrelated to preferences, such as infant mortality or 
the availability of means to control fertility. In particular, the wanted total fertility rate can 
exceed the desired number of children when women replace children who have died with 
additional births to reach the desired number of surviving children (Bongaarts 2011). 
Table 7 uses DHS data from 52 countries to present the average change in wanted 
fertility rates as a percentage of the change in TFR over the period analyzed. The change in 
wanted fertility is further decomposed into the contribution of changes in the desired number 
of children and a second (residual) component that captures other reasons, which might 
include changes in infant mortality (under the heading “other”). The data indicates that the 
fall in wanted fertility accounts for a significant share of the fall in TFR, and that a large part 
of the fall in wanted fertility can be accounted for by the decline in the number of desired 
children. The pattern is observed in both rural and urban areas. The large role played by the 
change in the desired or ideal number of children is supportive of the role played of 
population programs over and above the direct effect of lower mortality rates. 
Table 7 
Changes in wanted and unwanted fertility as a share of Total TFR 
Change as a % of change in 
TFR 
Overall Urban Rural 
      
Wanted fertility 75.35 63.48 82.26 
Ideal no. of children 57.97 56.08 51.92 
Other 17.38 7.41 30.35 
    
Unwanted fertility 24.65 36.52 17.74 
Notes: The table shows the change in wanted and unwanted (difference between total TFR and wanted) 
fertility rates as a percentage of the change in TFR using data from the Demographic and Health Surveys in 52 
countries. The change in wanted fertility is further decomposed into the contribution of the change in the ideal 
no. of children and a residual. Note that different countries are surveyed in different years. 
The last row of Table 7 reports the change in unwanted fertility also as a share of the 
change in TFR. Unwanted fertility is simply defined as the difference between TFR and wanted 
fertility. Unwanted fertility has also fallen in both urban and rural areas pointing to improved 
ability to control fertility given the wider availability of contraceptives. The decline in 
unwanted fertility is relatively less important as a share of the change in overall fertility. This, 
together with the large share accounted for the decline in the ideal number of children, is 
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consistent with the introduction of additional measures to promote a smaller family size as a 
result of the sluggish fertility response to wider contraception provision. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the rapid decline in fertility rates in the past five decades 
cannot be accounted for by economic growth, urbanization, education levels, or other 
socioeconomic variables. The timing and speed of the fertility decline coincides with the 
growth of a neo-Malthusian global population-control movement that designed and 
advocated a number of policy measures aimed at lowering fertility rates across the world. The 
precise measures chosen by different countries varied in nature and scope, depending on the 
individual country’s socioeconomic context. But common to almost all programs was an 
enhanced provision of contraceptive methods and mass-media campaigns to establish a new 
small-family norm. 
The global convergence in fertility to near replacement fertility rates will eventually 
ensure a constant world population, although the rise in life expectancy implies that it will 
take another few decades to reach a constant population level. Projections by the UN 
Population division suggest that populations in all regions except for Africa will stabilize by 
2050. Including Africa, for which the projections are more uncertain, world population is 
expected to stabilize by 2100 at around 11.2 billion, with total fertility rates converging to 2 
in all regions (UN Population Division 2015).  Concerns over possible imbalances between 
resources and population will not go away but will certainly be mitigated as population growth 
flattens out. Insofar as the US experience can be of guidance, the diffusion of contraception 
and the decline of fertility and postponement of childbearing could increase female 
empowerment in developing countries through higher levels of investment in human capital 
(Goldin and Katz 2002). To the extent that lower fertility rates are associated with higher 
investment in human capital, the trends bode well for development and living standards in 
the world’s poorest regions.  
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Appendix A 
TABLE A1 
Features of early family planning programs 
Strategy Method of implementation Description 
Increasing access to 
contraceptives 
Ministry of Health clinics or hospital-based 
facilities 
All countries with a state-led family planning program as well as countries where 
the state allowed private institutions to use state infrastructure provided family 
planning services in clinics and hospitals.  
Main examples: Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Kenya. 
  
Post-partum family planning in major 
hospitals 
Women counselled on birth spacing and contraceptive methods soon after 
delivery. Limited in scope as most deliveries did not take place in hospitals in 
most developing countries at the time 
Main examples: Iran, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Tunisia, Jamaica, Hong Kong, Thailand, 
Malaysia, India, Ghana. 
  
Pairing family planning with maternal and 
child health services 
While this was usually done in order to make use of existing medical 
infrastructure, particularly in rural areas, it was also carried out in countries that 
wished to maintain a low profile for their programs (e.g., Guatemala). 
Main examples: Iran, Chile, Colombia, Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia (rural 
areas), Philippines, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Brazil, Honduras, Botswana, 
Guatemala. 
  
Trained fieldworkers to reach remote, rural 
areas 
Midwives and/or community workers were trained to deliver and in some cases 
prescribe or administer contraceptive methods. 
Main examples: Egypt, Morocco, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Philippines, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Costa 
Rica, Colombia, Mexico, Iran, Nepal. 
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Mobile clinics and family planning camps Mobile clinics generally visited rural clinics, schools and government offices on a 
regular basis. The team usually consisted of one person to provide education and 
information and another to provide the medical services.  
Main examples: Iran, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Nepal, Honduras, Tunisia, 
Turkey, South Korea, India. 
In India and Nepal, large scale vasectomy camps were set up temporarily in 
primary health centers to perform sterilisations and insert IUDs 
  
Contraceptive provision through integrated 
rural development programs 
Rural development projects (including education, sanitation and agricultural 
projects) expanded to include a family planning component, usually in the form 
of program officers advocating and providing contraception to target population 
alongside their usual activities.  
Main examples: Philippines, Ghana, Iran, Turkey, Egypt. 
  
Employment based family planning 
programsa 
Contraceptive distribution, educational and promotional activities undertaken 
by employers or labour unions usually working in collaboration with a Family 
Planning Association or the government. 
Main examples: Tata Iron and Steel Company in India, the military in South Korea 
and Ecuador, Philippine Appliance Corporation, Misr Spinning and Weaving 
Company in Egypt, Coffee Grower's Association in Colombia, as well as employers 
in Kenya, Thailand, China, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Sri Lanka, labour unions in 
Turkey (TURK-IS) and Indonesia (Textile and Garment Labour Union). 
Later (starting in the 1980s) Latin America and the Caribbean (where most 
workers and their families are offered health care through the national social 
security system) extended their social security systems to include family 
planning. Main examples in Latin America: Mexico, Peru and Brazil.  
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Enabling private sector and NGO 
involvement 
In most countries, family planning programs were originally piloted by private 
family planning associations which were later supported by (through provision of 
state sector facilities and technical support) or taken over by the state. These 
associations continue to play a role in service provision and public education in 
many countries. 
Main examples: Family Planning Associations in Chile (APROFA), Colombia 
(PROFAMILIA), Guatemala (APROFAM), Jamaica (JFPA), Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Mexico, Brazil and Uruguay continue to be leaders in family planning activities 
alongside state programs. 
In Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Ghana, Kenya 
Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mauritius family planning associations laid the 
foundations for large scale national programs. 
  
Subsidised contraceptive provision and 
incentives for contraceptive usage 
This included state subsidisation of private sector sale of contraceptives (social 
marketing), provision of contraceptives at no cost, and provision of incentives for 
the use of contraceptives. 
Main examples: Social marketing programs in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Iran, 
Philippines, Honduras, Colombia, Mexico, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Mauritius, Taiwan. 
Certain family planning methods were provided free of charge in Jamaica, Iran, 
Turkey, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Morocco and China. 
Patients, providers and/or fieldworkers bringing in the patient for sterilisations 
and IUD insertions compensated for travel and time in Bangladesh, Nepal, India, 
Sri Lanka, South Korea. 
   
Educating public on 
population issues and 
contraceptive use 
Interpersonal communication with 
fieldworkers and community based 
education 
In addition to clinic based counselling, many programs employed fieldworkers to 
provide information about family planning at family planning clinics and child 
health centres, on a door to door basis and even at marriage and birth registries 
(Hong Kong).  
Main examples: Egypt, Chile, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Iran, Singapore. 
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In Singapore, lectures and seminars on family planning were organised for 
newlyweds, community leaders, teachers and school principals 
  
Print media such as posters, leaflets etc. Posters, leaflets, newspaper advertisements and magazine articles were used to 
disseminate information about the benefits of contraceptive use, technical 
information about specific contraceptive methods, nearest family planning 
clinics, as well as to create awareness about the benefits of having smaller 
families. 
Main examples: Turkey, Korea, Singapore, India, Kenya, Egypt, Iran, Mauritius, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia. 
  
Electronic mass media including radio, film 
and television (particularly important for 
reaching non-literate population)b 
Information on contraceptive use and population related issues was provided 
through spot announcements, interviews, news broadcasts, lectures, drama, 
advertisements and even music. Most early programs focused on radio, later 
branching out into TV. 
Main examples: use of radio for building awareness in Iran, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Indonesia (radio serial drama - Grains of sand in the sea), India, 
Colombia (radio spots pointing out benefits of having only the number of children 
that could be cared for, ending with the name and address of a PROFAMILIA 
clinic), Pakistan, Bangladesh, Costa Rica (nation-wide 10 minute radio program 
Dialogo), Mauritius, Egypt, Turkey. 
Later, television dramas and films were used in Hong Kong, Mexico, India, 
Bangladesh, Brazil etc. to promote family planning and establish a small family 
norm. TV spots carrying family planning messages were also used in Egypt, 
Nigeria, Mali, Liberia, Zimbabwe and Mauritius. 
  
Including population concepts and concerns 
in school curriculac 
Population topics were incorporated into social studies, geography, home 
economics, science and mathematics courses at primary and secondary school 
levels. Some Asian (Philippines, South Korea, China) and Latin American countries 
also incorporated material on human reproduction and family planning. 
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Main examples: Morocco, Turkey, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Philippines, Costa Rica, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, China, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, El Salvador, Iran, Mauritius. 
   
Other policies to 
encourage having fewer 
children 
  
Increasing the legal age of marriage Legal age of marriage increased in order to delay childbearing.  
Main examples: Tunisia, India, China. 
  
Incentives for having smaller families These include explicit policies to discourage couples from having too many 
children. 
Main examples: Limiting government family allowances to the first four children 
in Tunisia, number of children for which tax exemptions are claimed cut to four 
and restricting paid maternity leave to four children in Philippines, and restricting 
maternity leave to the first two children born, restricting income tax relief to the 
first three children, and giving priority for the allocation of public apartments for 
families with fewer children among other policies in Singapore. (See text for 
more discussion.) 
 
Notes: The table summarises key features of early family planning programs around the world. Information on programs in Egypt (Robinson and El-Zanaty 2007), Iran 
(Moore 2007), Tunisia (Brown 2007a), Morocco (Brown 2007b), Turkey (Akin 2007), Chile (Sanhueza 2007), Colombia (Measham and Lopez-Escobar 2007), Guatemala 
(Santiso-Galvez and Bertrand 2007), Jamaica (King 2007), South Korea (Kim and Ross 2007), Hong Kong (Fan 2007), Singapore (Teng 2007), Thailand (Rosenfield and Min 
2007), Indonesia (Hull 2007), Malaysia (Tey 2007), Philippines (Herrin 2007), India (Harkavy and Roy 2007), Bangladesh and Pakistan (Robinson 2007), Sri Lanka (Wright 
2007), Nepal (Tuladhar 2007), Ghana (Caldwell and Sai 2007) and Kenya (Heisel 2007) is from the compilation of case studies by Robinson and Ross (2007).  
Further information on the Latin American countries including Chile, Colombia and Guatemala is obtained from Shaffer (1968), Bertrand, Ward and Santiso-Galvez (2015) 
and the Latin American Population Association (2009). Information on China (pre one-child policy) is obtained from Attane (2002) and Wang (2012). Information on Taiwan 
is obtained from Sun (2001). Information on Mauritius is from Hogan, Kennedy, Obetsebi-Lamptey and Sawaya (1985) and the information on Botswana and Zimbabwe is 
taken from the report by the National Research Council Working Group on Factors Affecting Contraceptive Use (1993). 
a. Information on this section is obtained from Rinehart, Blackburn and Moore (1987) 
b.Information on this section is obtained from Gilluly and Moore (1986) and Church and Geller (1989) 
c.Information on this section is obtained from Sherris and Quillin (1982) 
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TABLE A2 
Effect of state-led family planning program implementation on fertility decline 
ΔTFRt (1) (2) (3) 
State program -0.066**   
 [0.023]   
L1.State program  -0.059**  
  [0.020]  
L2. State program   -0.050* 
   [0.018] 
ΔGDPt 0.005 0.001 -0.001 
 [0.077] [0.077] [0.079] 
ΔIMRt 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
ΔUrbant -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
ΔEdut 0.006 0.006 0.005 
 [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] 
    
Total obs. (NT) 1605 1605 1584 
R-squared 0.199 0.195 0.185 
Notes: The table reports the results of fixed effects regressions of the year on year change in TFR on a dummy 
variable for establishment of state family planning program (0 before establishment, 1 after), controlling for the 
year on year change in the log of per capita GDP, infant mortality rate, urban population as a % of total population 
and years of schooling of the population aged 25+. Columns (2) and (3) use 1 and 2 year lags of the program 
dummy, respectively. All regressions are estimated using a sample of 31 countries and include country and year 
fixed effects. Data on total fertility rate, urban population, per capita GDP, and infant mortality rate are from the 
World Development Indicators. Data on years of schooling is from Barro-Lee (2013). Since years of schooling at 
available at 5-yearly intervals we replace missing values with data from the closest year for which data is 
published. Data on family planning program implementation dates are compiled using information from 
Robinson and Ross (2007), Latin American Population Association (2009), Shaffer (1968), Bertrand et al (2015), 
Attane (2002), Hogan et al (1985) and National Academy Press (1993). The values in parentheses are robust 
standard errors.  
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level ***Significant at 1% level 
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TABLE A3 
Funds for family planning by country 
Country 
Total per capita 
funds 
Government per 
capita funds 
Non-government 
per capita funds 
Total funds as a % 
of GDP 
(in US cents) (in US cents) (in US cents) (in %) 
1970s 1980s 1970s 1980s 1970s 1980s 1970s 1980s 
Asia 
Afghanistan  2.56  0.00  2.56   
Bangladesh 41.02 186.56 16.39 36.24 24.63 150.32 0.07 0.47 
Hong Kong, China 54.65 66.00 26.74 48.42 27.91 17.57 0.01 0.00 
India 68.42 99.55 64.10 89.67 4.32 9.88 0.08 0.16 
Indonesia 74.75 101.37 39.52 71.38 35.23 29.99 0.09 0.11 
Korea, Rep. 108.63 147.06 85.32 132.12 23.32 14.94 0.04 0.46 
Malaysia 165.63 105.86 102.10 95.60 63.53 10.26 0.04 0.03 
Mongolia  6.60    6.60  0.00 
Nepal 28.06 35.94 15.67 27.93 12.40 8.02 0.07 0.12 
Pakistan 76.01 41.58 32.21 18.07 43.79 23.51 0.13 0.07 
Philippines 145.58 62.43 79.85 37.85 65.73 24.58 0.11 0.05 
Singapore 134.12 97.74 132.62 97.38 1.50 0.36 0.01 0.01 
Sri Lanka 16.11 16.68  11.76  4.92 0.02 0.02 
Taiwan 50.88 89.44 46.52 89.35 4.36 0.10   
Thailand 44.54 42.87 11.33 26.70 33.21 16.17 0.03 0.03 
Vietnam    5.81     
         
Latin America and Caribbean 
Bolivia 13.20  0.96  12.25  0.01  
Brazil  8.70 2.28 0.00  8.70   
Colombia 59.18 47.40  23.70  23.70 0.02 0.02 
Costa Rica 184.92 203.73 52.57 132.81 132.35 70.92 0.05 0.06 
Dominican Rep. 91.42  43.28  48.15  0.04  
El Salvador 300.66 324.76 237.06 235.47 63.60 89.29 0.15 0.22 
Honduras  125.80  0.00  125.80  0.08 
Nicaragua    204.57     
Panama  59.59  14.29  45.30  0.01 
Puerto Rico 897.43  390.17  507.26  0.09  
Trinidad and Tobago   26.51     
Venezuela   123.35 1.50     
         
North Africa and Middle East 
Egypt 16.33  1.81 11.96 14.51  0.01  
Iran 248.01  243.34 0.07 4.67  0.05  
Iraq  3.26  2.25  1.02  0.00 
Jordan  61.82  21.45  40.37  0.02 
Morocco  55.53  45.49  10.05  0.03 
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Country 
Total per capita 
funds 
Government per 
capita funds 
Non-government 
per capita funds 
Total funds as a % 
of GDP 
(in US cents) (in US cents) (in US cents) (in %) 
1970s 1980s 1970s 1980s 1970s 1980s 1970s 1980s 
Tunisia 124.05 130.23 36.10 73.57 87.96 56.66 0.05 0.06 
Turkey 23.03 23.58 21.81 20.51 1.22 3.06 0.01 0.01 
         
Sub Saharan Africa 
Botswana  15.40  7.48  7.93  0.01 
Burkina Faso  23.93  6.70  17.23  0.05 
Central African Rep. 35.21  16.93  18.28  0.05 
Congo, Rep.    0.37     
Ethiopia  6.66      0.02 
Ghana 49.70  40.64  9.06  0.04  
Guinea  15.24  0.71  14.53  0.02 
Kenya  43.36  12.25  31.11  0.07 
Liberia  48.34      0.08 
Madagascar  3.78  1.46  2.32  0.01 
Mauritania  29.51  0.76  28.75  0.04 
Mauritius 356.05 385.87 180.29 244.30 175.76 141.58 0.11 0.12 
Nigeria  9.39      0.02 
Rwanda  55.90  29.90  25.99  0.10 
Somalia  2.00      0.01 
Tanzania 7.52  0.35  7.17    
Uganda 5.63      0.01  
Zambia  23.26  3.53  19.73  0.03 
Zimbabwe 51.70 142.60 45.47 100.50 6.23 42.10 0.02 0.10 
Notes: The table reports the total funds for family planning per capita and per capita funds for family planning 
by source: government or nongovernment for the 1970s and 1980s. (We compute averages for the two decades 
as different countries have data for different years.) Averages for the 1970s and 1980s are computed in constant 
2005 U.S.$ cents for comparability. The final two columns report the total funds for family planning as a 
percentage of GDP (both in nominal terms) averaged for the 1970s and 1980s. Data on funding for family 
planning are taken from Nortman and Hofstatter (1978), Nortman (1982), and Ross, Mauldin, and Miller (1993), 
while data on the price index (for conversion to real terms) and nominal GDP are from the WDI. 
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TABLE A4 
Change in fertility rates (1980-2013) and funding for family planning programs 
Change in TFR 
Absolute 
change % change 
Ln(average funds per 
capita) 
-0.257* -5.213*** 
[0.141] [1.619] 
Change in years of 
education of adults 
-0.168 -0.023 
[0.130] [0.015] 
Change in urban population 
as % of total 
-0.022 -0.028 
[0.013] [0.021] 
Change in ln(GDP per 
capita) 
0.331 -0.147 
[0.298] [0.199] 
Change in infant mortality 
rate 
0.018*** 0.301*** 
[0.005] [0.092] 
Change in female LFPR 0.003 -0.026 
 [0.008] [0.022] 
   
R-squared 0.402 0.542 
Notes: The table reports the results of regressions of the change in TFR between 2013 and 1980 on the logged 
value of average per capita funds for family planning for the 1970s, 80s and 90s, controlling for the changes in 
years of schooling of the population aged 25+, urban population as a percentage of total population, log GDP per 
capita infant mortality rate and female labor force participation rate between 2013 and 1980. All regressions 
include a constant and use a sample of 43 countries. Total per capita funds for family planning are converted to 
2005 US$ before averaging. Data on total fertility rate, urban population, per capita GDP, infant mortality rate and 
US Consumer Price Index (used to convert the funds to real terms) are from the World Development Indicators. 
Data on years of schooling is from Barro-Lee (2013). Data on female labor force participation rate is from ILOSTAT. 
Data on funds for family planning are from Nortman and Hofstatter (1978), Nortman (1982) and Ross, Mauldin 
and Miller (1993). The values in parentheses are robust standard errors.  
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level ***Significant at 1% level 
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TABLE A5 
Change in fertility rates and funding for family planning program by source 
Change in TFR (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(average government 
funds per capita) 
-0.250**  -0.241** 
[0.116]  [0.117] 
Ln(average private funds per 
capita) 
 -0.125 -0.060 
 [0.128] [0.095] 
Change in years of education 
of adult population 
-0.047 -0.199 -0.069 
[0.121] [0.138] [0.123] 
Change in urban population 
as % of total 
-0.014* -0.007 -0.013 
[0.007] [0.010] [0.008] 
Change in ln(GDP per capita) -0.377* -0.369 -0.382* 
[0.216] [0.246] [0.223] 
Change in infant mortality 
rate 
0.004* 0.004 0.005* 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
    
R-squared 0.445 0.34 0.449 
Notes: The table reports the results of regressions of the change in TFR between 2013 and 1960 on the logged 
value of average per capita funds for family planning from the state and private sources for the 1970s, 80s and 
90s, controlling for the changes in years of schooling of the population aged 25+, urban population as a 
percentage of total population, log GDP per capita and infant mortality rate between 2013 and 1960. All 
regressions include a constant and use a sample of 31 countries. Total per capita funds for family planning are 
converted to 2005 US$ before averaging. Data on total fertility rate, urban population, per capita GDP, infant 
mortality rate and US Consumer Price Index (used to convert the funds to real terms) are from the World 
Development Indicators. Data on years of schooling is from Barro-Lee (2013). Data on funds for family planning 
are from Nortman and Hofstatter (1978), Nortman (1982) and Ross, Mauldin and Miller (1993). The values in 
parentheses are robust standard errors.  
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level ***Significant at 1% level 
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TABLE A6 
Program effort score by region 
Region 1972 1982 1989 1994 1999 
Europe and Central Asia 20.0 27.0 46.0 42.2 53.0 
East Asia and the Pacific 39.4 46.1 52.5 55.7 58.5 
Latin America and the Caribbean 30.2 39.0 50.6 50.3 50.0 
North Africa and the Middle East 11.4 17.9 40.5 41.8 58.3 
South Asia 24.3 46.3 55.6 56.8 64.4 
Sub Saharan Africa 5.0 15.5 36.7 43.9 51.1 
Total 19.3 28.5 44.3 47.8 53.6 
      
No. of countries 89 94 92 95 88 
Notes: The table reports the average family planning program effort score for each region. The regional averages 
are calculated using data from Ross and Stover (2001). 
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Appendix B 
 
In formulas, the overall fertility rate equals the weighted average of urban and rural 
fertility rates: 
𝐹𝑡 = 𝜆𝑅,𝑡𝐹𝑅,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑈,𝑡𝐹𝑈,𝑡 
Where 𝜆𝑅,𝑡 is the proportion of the country’s population living in rural areas in period t, 𝜆𝑈,𝑡 =
1 − 𝜆𝑅,𝑡, and 𝐹𝑅,𝑡 and 𝐹𝑈,𝑡 are the rural and urban fertility rates at time t, respectively. 
 
With some algebra, the change in overall fertility between time 0 and time t can be exactly 
decomposed as: 
∆𝐹𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡 − 𝐹0 = (∆𝜆𝑅,𝑡?̅?𝑅,𝑡 + ∆𝜆𝑈,𝑡?̅?𝑈,𝑡) + (?̅?𝑅,𝑡∆𝐹𝑅,𝑡 + ?̅?𝑈,𝑡∆𝐹𝑈,𝑡) 
 
 
 
 
      
 Urbanization (between-
effect)
      
    Within-effect 
 
where 0 and t correspond to the start and end of the period, respectively; and the terms 
denoted with a bar are the time averages: 
?̅?𝑗 =
𝑥𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑥𝑗,0
2
, 𝑗 = 𝑅, 𝑈; 𝑥 = 𝜆, 𝐹 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Between (urbanization) effect Within effect 
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TABLE B1 
Fertility rate decomposition by region 
Country 
Fertility 
decline 
Between-
effect 
Within-
effect 
First 
year 
Last 
year 
Albania 1.05 1.55% 98.45% 2002 2008 
Armenia 0.04 -11.09% 111.09% 2000 2010 
Azerbaijan 0.06 7.97% 92.03% 2001 2006 
Bangladesh 0.99 6.75% 93.25% 1993 2011 
Benin 1.10 6.85% 93.15% 1996 2011 
Bolivia 1.66 15.56% 84.44% 1989 2008 
Brazil 0.91 14.56% 85.44% 1986 1996 
Burkina Faso 0.67 43.07% 56.93% 1993 2010 
Burundi 0.48 19.16% 80.84% 1987 2010 
Cambodia 0.69 2.03% 97.97% 2000 2010 
Cameroon 0.71 29.33% 70.67% 1991 2011 
Chad 0.05 4.07% 95.93% 1996 2004 
Colombia 1.11 11.59% 88.41% 1986 2010 
Comoros 0.23 -1.27% 101.27% 1996 2012 
Congo Dem. Rep. -0.13 -41.38% 141.38% 2007 2013 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.38 57.77% 42.23% 1994 2011 
Dominican Rep. 1.43 15.20% 84.80% 1986 2013 
Ecuador 1.17 10.51% 89.49% 1987 2004 
Egypt 1.74 -0.49% 100.49% 1988 2008 
El Salvador 2.05 12.54% 87.46% 1985 2008 
Eritrea 1.23 3.07% 96.93% 1995 2002 
Ethiopia 0.57 15.44% 84.56% 2000 2011 
Gabon 0.04 361.30% -261.30% 2000 2012 
Ghana 2.39 10.49% 89.51% 1988 2008 
Guatemala 1.87 8.42% 91.58% 1987 2008 
Guinea 0.49 18.97% 81.03% 1999 2012 
Haiti 1.66 30.37% 69.63% 1994 2012 
Honduras 2.11 8.00% 92.00% 1996 2011 
India 0.70 4.39% 95.61% 1992 2005 
Indonesia 0.58 24.33% 75.67% 1987 2012 
Jordan 2.07 5.15% 94.85% 1990 2012 
Kazakhstan 0.46 0.02% 99.98% 1995 1999 
Kenya 2.00 7.75% 92.25% 1989 2008 
Kyrgyzstan -0.32 1.56% 98.44% 1997 2012 
Lesotho 0.08 62.90% 37.10% 2004 2009 
Liberia 1.63 4.13% 95.87% 1986 2013 
Madagascar 1.49 10.45% 89.55% 1992 2008 
Malawi 0.96 6.09% 93.91% 1992 2010 
50 
 
Mali 1.22 16.51% 83.49% 1987 2012 
Moldova 0.22 -2.15% 102.15% 1997 2005 
      
Country 
Fertility 
decline 
Between-
effect 
Within-
effect 
First 
year 
Last 
year 
Mozambique -0.84 -4.38% 104.38% 1997 2011 
Namibia 1.75 19.12% 80.88% 1992 2013 
Nepal 1.99 4.52% 95.48% 1996 2011 
Nicaragua 1.09 3.00% 97.00% 1998 2006 
Niger -0.66 -5.96% 105.96% 1992 2012 
Nigeria 0.41 56.66% 43.34% 1990 2013 
Pakistan 1.09 5.03% 94.97% 1990 2012 
Paraguay 2.35 6.57% 93.43% 1990 2008 
Peru 1.58 14.41% 85.59% 1986 2012 
Philippines 1.07 -3.87% 103.87% 1993 2013 
Rwanda 1.72 16.41% 83.59% 1992 2010 
Senegal 1.34 6.12% 93.88% 1986 2010 
Sierra Leone 0.21 15.80% 84.20% 2008 2013 
Tanzania 0.89 19.59% 80.41% 1991 2010 
Togo 1.33 8.81% 91.19% 1988 1998 
Turkey -0.12 -14.29% 114.29% 1993 1998 
Uganda 1.05 10.59% 89.41% 1988 2011 
Ukraine 0.41 0.13% 99.87% 1999 2007 
Notes: The table reports the overall decline in fertility, the percentage of the change due to the between-area 
effect (urbanization effect) and within-area-effect, and the years over which the overall change is calculated. 
Data on urban and rural fertility rates are obtained from the Demographic and Health Surveys, while the 
proportion of urban population is taken from the World Development Indicators database. 
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FIGURE B1 
Decomposition of the decline in fertility rates by region 
 
Notes: The figure plots the decomposition of the overall fall in fertility into the urbanization effect and the 
within-area effect. The data on urban and rural fertility is taken from the Demographic and Health Survey 
database and covers 63 developing countries over different time periods. The data on proportion of 
population living in urban areas for the corresponding years is taken from the World Development Indicators 
database. (See Table A1 in the Appendix for more details.) 
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Appendix C 
In the paper we argue that the origins of the population control movement can be traced to 
the West. In what follows, we reproduce extracts from historical documents reflecting the 
preoccupation of intellectuals and policy makers in the West with the high fertility levels. 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 1934, in a letter to his father 
“In concluding, may I add one further statement in regard to my interest in birth control. I 
have come pretty definitely to the conclusion that it is the field in which I will be interested, 
for the present at least, to concentrate my own giving, as I feel that it is so fundamental and 
underlying.” [Rockefeller 1934] 
Report of the President’s Committee to Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program, 1959 
“[T]hese high fertility rates are normally a part of deeply rooted cultural patterns, and natural 
changes occur only slowly. In many countries, national production is failing even to keep pace 
with population growth, and per capita gross national product and food supplies are therefore 
decreasing rather than increasing. 
Government leaders in many of the less developed nations recognize that the only hope for 
their people lies in accelerating the normal adjustment to the rapidly declining mortality rate. 
Few countries have set up the necessary programs, although broad acceptance has been 
found in those areas where programs have been established.  
The United States and the other more advanced countries can and should be prepared to 
respond to requests for information and technical assistance in connection with population 
growth. Such information will help to point up the seriousness of the problem, and to 
encourage action in countries where population pressures exist. Such information is also 
useful in defining the areas in which initial efforts will be most effective. Recognizing an 
immediate problem created by the rapid growth, the United States should also increase its 
assistance to local programs relating to maternal and child welfare. 
We Recommend: That, in order to meet more effectively the problems of economic 
development, the United States ( 1) assist those countries with which it is cooperating in 
economic aid programs, on request, in the formulation of their plans designed to deal with 
the problem of rapid population growth, ( 2 ) increase its assistance to local programs relating 
to maternal and child welfare in recognition of the immediate problem created by rapid 
population growth, and (3) strongly support studies and appropriate research as a part of its 
own Mutual Security Program, within the United Nations and elsewhere, leading to the 
availability of relevant information in a form most useful to individual countries in the 
formulation of practical programs to meet the serious challenge posed by rapidly expanding 
populations.” [Draper 1959, p 96-97] 
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John D. Rockefeller Jr. at the National Conference on the Population Crisis 1960 
“In May 1960 at a National Conference on the Population Crisis co-sponsored by the Dallas 
Council on World Affairs and Newsweek magazine, John D. Rockefeller 3rd made a plea that 
was to be repeated many times in the decade ahead: 
The problems of population are so great, so important, so ramified and so immediate that 
only government, supported and inspired by private initiative, can attack them on the scale 
required. It is for the citizens to convince their political leaders of the need for imaginative 
and courageous action-action which may sometimes mean political and economic 
opposition.” [Piotrow 1973, p 49] 
Enke (1960) based on discussions with senior officials and Prime Minister of the Indian 
government  
“The willingness versus ability of adults to limit births has long been a matter of controversy. 
A cheap and available contraceptive pill will not be the answer in Asia unless couples wish to 
avoid pregnancies… In the "extended" or three generation households of Asia, which still 
predominate in rural areas, children are not a liability to their parents during their infancy. 
And they are a real asset in later life to their procreators.  
It is not enough for governments in these countries to support clinics that provide 
contraceptive information. It is not practical to tax extra children. Instead, governments must 
offer some strong and positive inducement to couples to limit births. Money might be such 
an incentive if paid in large enough amounts. Or other costly benefits, such as the education 
and support of parents' existing children, might be offered.” [Enke 1960, p 343] 
… In countries that are already overpopulated, and have crude population increases of 2 
percent a year, there may not be time to wait for uncertain birth reductions following 
urbanization, emancipation of women, and a delayed recognition that falling death rates have 
reduced the number of infants a couple must have to obtain a given size family of grown 
children.  
The knowledge and availability of contraceptives can be increased by government action. But 
the ability rather than the willingness to limit family size is affected thereby. Even a 
contraceptive pill is no panacea for the same reason. It may benefit "emerging" urban parents 
but not untutored rural peasants. And, even if the pill cost only 10 cents, the total resource 
cost over the fertile period of a woman's life would exceed $100. So money payments to men 
and women to constrain family size--in the ways described here--may be far more effective a 
limitation and much cheaper in resources. Schemes of this kind may do more for suffering 
humanity than successful medical research on contraceptives.” [p 348] 
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Davis (1967) on the effectiveness of family planning programs 
“By sanctifying the doctrine that each woman should have the number of children she wants, 
and by assuming that if she has only that number this will automatically curb population 
growth to the necessary degree, the leaders of current policies escape the necessity of asking 
why women desire so many children and how this desire can be influenced … Instead they 
claim that satisfactory motivation is shown by the popular desire (shown by opinion surveys 
in all countries) to have the means of family limitation, and that therefore the problem is one 
of inventing and distributing the best possible contraceptive devices. Overlooked is the fact 
that a desire for availability of contraceptives is compatible with high fertility … We thus see 
that the inadequacy of current population policies with respect to motivation is inherent in 
their overwhelmingly family planning character. [Davis 1967, p 733-734] 
… If excessive population growth is to be prevented, the obvious requirement is somehow to 
impose restraints on the family… Population-control policy can de-emphasize the family in 
two ways: (i) by keeping present controls over illegitimate childbirth yet making the most of 
factors that lead people to postpone or avoid marriage and (ii) by instituting conditions that 
motivate those who do marry to their families small. [p 737] 
… In any deliberate effort to control the birth rate along these lines, a government has two 
powerful instruments – its command over economic planning and its authority (real or 
potential) over education. The first determines (as far as policy can) the economic conditions 
and circumstances affecting the lives of all citizens; the second provides the knowledge and 
attitudes necessary to implement the plans. The economic system largely determines who 
shall work, what can be bought, what rearing children will cost, how much individuals can 
spend.  The schools define family roles and develop vocational and recreational interests; they 
could, if it were desired, redefine the sex roles, develop interests that transcend the home, 
and transmit realistic (as opposed to moralistic) knowledge concerning marriage, sexual 
behaviour, and population problems. When the problem is viewed in this light, it is clear that 
the ministries of economics and education, not the ministry of health, should be the source 
of population policy.” [p 738] 
John D. Rockefeller Jr. in a speech at the Population Tribune in Bucharest, 1974 
“It turns out that women who avail themselves of family planning are chiefly those who 
already have had many children. Over the 40-year span I have referred to, the population of 
the world has increased by 86 percent, from 2.1 billion to 3.9 billion. And the absolute number 
of people in poverty has continued to grow. Clearly, the programs that have been undertaken 
have proved inadequate when compared to the magnitude of the problems facing us. [p 511] 
… [R]apid population growth is only one among many problems facing most countries, it is a 
multiplier and intensifier of other problems…. [R]educing population growth is not an 
alternative to development, but an essential part of it for most countries.” [p 512] 
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National Security Study Memorandum 200 (The Kissinger Report), 1974 
“High birth rates appear to stem primarily from: 
a. inadequate information about and availability of means of fertility control;  
b. inadequate motivation for reduced numbers of children combined with 
motivation for many children resulting from still high infant and child mortality and 
need for support in old age; and 
c. the slowness of change in family preferences in response to changes in 
environment. 
… We cannot wait for overall modernization and development to produce lower 
fertility rates naturally since this will undoubtedly take many decades in most 
developing countries, during which time rapid population growth will tend to slow 
development and widen even more the gap between rich and poor. [National Security 
Council 1974, p 6-7] 
…The political consequences of current population factors in the LDCs - rapid growth, 
internal migration, high percentages of young people, slow improvement in living 
standards, urban concentrations, and pressures for foreign migration — are damaging 
to the internal stability and international relations of countries in whose advancement 
the U.S. is interested, thus creating political or even national security problems for the 
U.S. In a broader sense, there is a major risk of severe damage to world economic, 
political, and ecological systems and, as these systems begin to fail, to our humanitarian 
values. [p 8] 
…While specific goals in this area are difficult to state, our aim should be for the world to 
achieve a replacement level of fertility, (a two- child family on the average), by about the 
year 2000. [p 9] 
…The World Population Plan of Action is not self-enforcing and will require vigorous 
efforts by interested countries, U.N. agencies and other international bodies to make it 
effective. U.S. leadership is essential. The strategy must include the following elements 
and actions:  
(a) Concentration on key countries.  Assistance for population moderation should give 
primary emphasis to the largest and fastest growing developing countries where there 
is special U.S. political and strategic interest. Those countries are: India, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines, Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, 
Ethiopia and Columbia. Together, they account for 47 percent of the world's current 
population increase. (It should be recognized that at present AID bilateral assistance to 
some of these countries may not be acceptable.) Bilateral assistance, to the extent that 
funds are available, will be given to other countries, considering such factors as 
population growth, need for external assistance, long-term U.S. interests and willingness 
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to engage in self-help. Multilateral programs must necessarily have a wider coverage 
and the bilateral programs of other national donors will be shaped to their particular 
interests. At the same time, the U.S. will look to the multilateral agencies, especially the 
U.N. Fund for Population Activities which already has projects in over 80 countries to 
increase population assistance on a broader basis with increased U.S. contributions. This 
is desirable in terms of U.S. interests and necessary in political terms in the United 
Nations. But progress nevertheless, must be made in the key 13 and our limited 
resources should give major emphasis to them.  
(b) Integration of population factors and population programs into country development 
planning. As called for the world Population Plan of Action, developing countries and 
those aiding them should specifically take population factors into account in national 
planning and include population programs in such plans.  
(c) Increased assistance for family planning services, information and technology. This is 
a vital aspect of any world population program. 1) Family planning information and 
materials based on present technology should be made fully available as rapidly as 
possible to the 85 % of the populations in key LDCs not now reached, essentially rural 
poor who have the highest fertility. 
(d) Fundamental and developmental research should be expanded, aimed at simple, 
low-cost, effective, safe, long-lasting and acceptable methods of fertility control. 
Support by all federal agencies for biomedical research in this field should be increased 
by $60 million annually.  
(e) Creating conditions conducive to fertility decline. For its own merits and consistent 
with the recommendations of the World Population Plan of Action, priority should be 
given in the general aid program to selective development policies in sectors offering 
the greatest promise of increased motivation for smaller family size. In many cases pilot 
programs and experimental research will be needed as guidance for later efforts on a 
larger scale. The preferential sectors include:…-- Developing alternatives to children as 
a source of old age security;  
-- Education of new generations on the desirability of smaller families. [p 10-11] 
…The U.S. should encourage LDC leaders to take the lead in advancing family planning 
and population stabilization both within multilateral organizations and through bilateral 
contacts with other LDCs. This will require that the President and the Secretary of State 
treat the subject of population growth control as a matter of paramount importance and 
address it specifically in their regular contacts with leaders of other governments, 
particularly LDCs. [p 12] 
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